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Chapter 1 
Toward a Phenomenology of Abnormality 
Jenny Slatman 
Introduction 
The contrast between health and illness is often equated with the contrast between normal and 
abnormal, where health is seen as the normal state and illness as the abnormal one. In 
contemporary health care, what belongs to the domain of the normal is determined based on 
scientific insights, consensus within professional groups, and social and political norms. Against 
the background of current health policy that emphasizes a commitment to early and preventive 
treatment, it makes sense that the American Heart Association in November 2017 changed the 
standard for high blood pressure from 140/90 mmHg to 130/80 mmHg. The consequence of this 
adjustment is that 46 percent of the American population now suffers from hypertension.1 This 
example shows how changeable standards or norms are, while at the same time making it clear 
that abnormality—not meeting the standard—is not necessarily equivalent to illness. Most 
people whose blood pressure is just above the new standard do not suffer from anything at all. 
Doctors may want to treat them, but if we label all these people as “ill,” we end up with very few 
healthy people. 
For most people, being ill or sick means suffering from something, experiencing pain or 
discomfort. If we limit ourselves here to somatic complaints, we could say that illness, as 
demonstrated by the blood pressure example, usually goes hand in hand with a certain form of 
bodily abnormality; however, bodily abnormality does not always go hand in hand with illness. 
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In the same vein, having a genetic abnormality does not necessarily mean that you are currently 
ill, or will ever become ill. Other cases in which abnormality and illness do not always coincide 
include a range of physical limitations as well as visible physical abnormalities. If, after a 
diagnosis and successful treatment of cancer, you continue to live with one breast or without a 
nose, you are not sick, but you are abnormal. In addition, people with impairments can be said to 
deviate from the norm of normal functioning, but, very often, this is not seen as a disease but 
rather as a disability.2 Perhaps even more importantly, a person with an impairment is often 
directly identified by others as abnormal. If you have only one leg, you are not sick, but you are 
abnormal.  
In my previous research project Bodily Integrity in Blemished Bodies, I studied physical 
changes that occur as a result of cancer and cancer treatment and how people handled these 
changes.3 Central to this research was the question of how people experience their visibly 
changed bodies. In order to understand these experiences, it was critical to see the individuals in 
their social context. These people did not only have to deal with a changed body but also with 
the fact that others might see them as abnormal because they are, for example, missing a breast, 
have a visible scar, or use a facial prosthesis. It will come as no surprise that the phenomenology 
of the body was at the heart of this research, for indeed, a phenomenological approach greatly 
facilitates the interpretation of embodied self-experiences. However, during this research project 
it also became clear that conventional phenomenology has its limitations.  
Phenomenology is well suited for interpreting the phenomenon of illness, of being ill 
from a first-person perspective. Yet it provides far fewer tools for analyzing the phenomenon of 
bodily abnormality. Indeed, a sociological and/or social constructivist approach might seem 
more suitable for understanding abnormality. Yet, as I have suggested elsewhere, 
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phenomenology can account for third-person perspectives on the body if it is developed in the 
direction of a sociophenomenology.4 In this chapter I will elaborate on this suggestion and show 
how phenomenology can account for both illness and abnormality.  
For my analysis, I will first return to the most important source text for contemporary 
phenomenology of health and illness: Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. 
In the first part of this chapter I will explain why, according to Merleau-Ponty, illness cannot be 
equated with abnormality. The distinction between illness and abnormality, I will explain, stems 
from the phenomenological methodological consideration of putting scientific knowledge and 
prejudices in parentheses. Merleau-Ponty was also profoundly inspired by the work of the 
German neurologist and psychiatrist Kurt Goldstein, who in The Organism writes, “It may be 
stated as certain that any disease is an abnormality, but not that every abnormality is a disease. 
No matter how we may define normality, there are certainly many digressions from the norm that 
do not mean being sick.”5 Merleau-Ponty’s contemporary Georges Canguilhem also bases his 
main work, The Normal and the Pathological, on the work of Goldstein. Since Canguilhem 
discusses the distinction between the normal and the pathological much more explicitly than 
Merleau-Ponty, I will discuss their work in parallel.  
From my analysis of these three authors, it will emerge that the use of statistics plays an 
important role in the distinction between illness and abnormality. According to phenomenology, 
statistics as a form of scientific knowledge must be bracketed. However, while following 
Merleau-Ponty’s remark that the most important lesson to be learned from the phenomenological 
reduction is the impossibility of a total reduction,6 I will, in the second part of this chapter, show 
that statistics should not be banned from understanding our lifeworld nor simply put in 
parentheses. I begin by reviewing Ian Hacking’s analysis of how the rise of the concept of 
Post print. Published as: 
Jenny Slatman (2021). Toward a Phenomenology of Abnormality. In: Susan Bredlau & Talia Welsh (eds). 
Normality, Abnormality, and Pathology in Merleau Ponty. Albany NY: SUNY Press, p. 19-39 
 
“normal” occurred at the same time as the rise of statistics in the nineteenth century.7 Even 
though statistics is inherently descriptive in nature, Hacking asserts that it soon acquires a 
normative, prescriptive function. Our world is largely made up of “averages” that are considered 
to be normal and normative. Physical deviations from an average not only imply a statistical 
observation but also give rise to a judgment of some kind of failure. Thus, I will argue, physical 
deviation directly affects embodied subjectivity and agency.  
Illness in the Phenomenology of Perception 
In his philosophical analyses of the body, embodiment, and perception, Merleau-Ponty (1908–
1961) makes extensive use of pathological cases. Let us first have a look at why he uses cases of 
illness within his philosophical analyses of embodiment. Since he contrasts the sick person (le 
malade) with the person who is normal (le normal), it seems that he uses illness to explain what 
is normal, that he understands normal embodiment or perception on the basis of pathological 
cases. Yet, this is too hasty a conclusion; his use of pathological cases needs to be placed in the 
context of his phenomenological approach. As Merleau-Ponty clearly describes in the preface to 
the Phenomenology of Perception, the phenomenological reduction and the eidetic reduction (or 
variation) are crucial methodological steps for phenomenology. The use of pathological cases fits 
within the design of the eidetic reduction; these cases serve as the variations necessary for 
finding the eidetic or the invariant of the embodied existence. In Husserl’s view of the eidetic 
variation, intellectual imagination plays the most important role. In order to be able to determine 
the eidetic nature of something, we need to think up or imagine all possible forms of a particular 
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phenomenon and then examine what cannot be omitted without the phenomenon ceasing to be 
the phenomenon in question.  
For Merleau-Ponty, however, the eidetic variation is not just an intellectual exercise in 
which everything possible is first thought or fantasized to see what cannot be omitted. He uses 
factual variation and factual cases in order to arrive at something like the eidetic or the essential. 
In the preface, Merleau-Ponty describes this seemingly contradictory idea of a philosophy that 
focuses on the essential or essences while connecting to the factual as follows: “Phenomenology 
is the study of essences . . . [and yet it] is also a philosophy that places essences back within 
existence and thinks that the only way to understand man and the world is by beginning from 
their ‘facticity.’”8 
According to Merleau-Ponty, the normal cannot be derived from the pathological because 
illness is not the same as the loss of normal functions. Pathology and normality are different 
modalities of the same underlying phenomenon.9 What the underlying phenomenon is becomes 
clear when we focus on the case of Schneider, first described by Gelb and Goldstein in 1920. 
This case plays a crucial role in Merleau-Ponty’s conception of embodiment, and he describes it 
vividly in “The Spatiality of One’s Own Body and Motricity” in the Phenomenology of 
Perception. Johann Schneider was a World War I veteran who suffered brain damage as a result 
of shrapnel. Due to this brain damage, his way of perceiving, orienting, and moving was 
considerably affected. Psychiatrists at the time classified his case as one of “psychic 
blindness.”10 Schneider was not blind, but with his eyes closed he was unable to perform so-
called “abstract movements,” movements that are artificially elicited. For example, when 
requested by his doctor, Schneider was not able to touch his nose (with his eyes closed) or to 
bend or stretch his limbs on command. However, if his nose was itchy, he could immediately 
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touch his nose (with his eyes closed), and he could also find the handkerchief in his pocket to 
blow his nose. These kinds of movements are called “concrete movements;” though they are 
mechanically and physiologically the same as the abstract movements, they differ from abstract 
movements because they do not exceed a person’s actual situation.  
The fact that Schneider could not point to his nose on command should not be explained 
in terms of a defect in the sensory-motor system, as if something were wrong with a sense organ 
or a muscle. Pointing (Zeigen, abstract movement) and grasping (Greifen, concrete movement), 
although they have the same underlying anatomy and physiology, are two different intentional 
actions. The difference between the two forms of movement shows a variation in how we can 
relate to the world. Whereas concrete movement is primarily a way of dealing with our actual 
situation, abstract movement is about transcending that situation. The difference between the two 
forms of movement also shows a variation in the extent to which motor actions take place in a 
reflective or prereflective manner. Concrete movements generally take place without reflection 
or thought, whereas abstract movements require one’s awareness of what one is doing. If you are 
asked to point to your nose on command, this is a movement that you think about for a moment; 
yet when your nose itches, you scratch it without reflection. It should be noted, however, that a 
concrete movement is not the same as a reflexive movement, such as moving one’s lower leg 
when the knee is tapped with a reflex hammer. Whereas a reflex cannot be controlled, concrete 
movements can be controlled. You can become aware of concrete movements and reflect on 
them. Normally, though, this is not necessary, and the movement takes place in the flow of the 
situation. 
Considering these two different forms of movement as possible variations of the 
phenomenon of embodied existence, we find motor intentionality as the invariant underlying 
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both. According to Merleau-Ponty, motor intentionality is founded in what he calls the 
“intentional arc.”11 Our entire conscious life is underpinned by this arc, which contains a 
projection of our past, present, and future as well as of our social environment and our physical, 
moral, and ideological situation. This intentional arc allows us to situate ourselves somewhere 
and in a certain way(s). Yet in Schneider’s case, Merleau-Ponty argues, his intentional arc is 
weakened (se détend) and its span into the future is diminished.12 The metaphor of tensile 
strength and span refers to the possibilities, or the existential “I can” that people have. Our 
consciousness, says Merleau-Ponty, is not first of all an “I think,” as Descartes and Kant said, but 
an “I can” (je peux).13 The consequence of Schneider’s injury, therefore, is not just a matter of 
his being unable to perform tasks because of his defects. It is also matter of what possibilities he 
experiences the world as offering him. Both the environment and the situation in which a person 
finds themselves and the physical functioning of that person determine together, as if in a 
dialogue, what that person’s possibilities are. For Merleau-Ponty, having fewer possibilities, 
having a flaccid arc, is what is most characteristic of what we call illness. Schneider, the sick 
person, has fewer possibilities. The way he deals with his world and environment is 
characterized by a high degree of awkwardness. Illness, so we can say, affects his entire being, 
his existence. 
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty does not elaborate on how the dividing 
line between normality and illness is drawn. By taking a pathological case from clinical 
literature, he appears to assume unreservedly that medical literature defines where the line 
between the healthy and the pathological should be drawn. In addition, because he does not give 
a description of what is normal, he could be accused of a rather naive idea of normality: that 
normality is that which is not described in the clinical literature and is something that is given 
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naturally. However, this is not the case. Merleau-Ponty describes illness as affecting a person’s 
intentional arc. This description implies a dynamic understanding of both normality and 
pathology. In Merleau-Ponty’s own work, this dynamic concept is not really made explicit—
illness and normality are by no means the main themes in his work. In order to make it clear how 
we can interpret illness and normality as dynamic and as nonnaturalistic, I will now briefly 
discuss a number of elements from the work of Goldstein and Canguilhem. 
The Normal and the Pathological According to Goldstein and Canguilhem 
Kurt Goldstein (1878–1965) was an important inspiration for Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of 
embodiment. From 1916 onward, he worked as a neurologist and psychiatrist in Frankfurt, where 
he saw many World War I veterans with brain damage, including Johann Schneider. According 
to Goldstein, health represents the most adequate way in which the organism deals with its 
environment. Health, therefore, consists mainly of “preferred behavior” or “orderly behavior.”14 
By this, he means that the way the human organism acts is based on all kinds of habits (and 
skills) that have been acquired through time, tradition, and education. From this, it immediately 
becomes clear that health or healthy action is not something universal but is instead always 
bound to a certain time and place in which preferences have been developed. Normality or health 
is therefore not based on a predetermined scientific or moral norm but is formed within a process 
of habituation. In other words, according to Goldstein, there is no such thing as a supra-
individual norm that prescribes what normal or healthy physicality is. The norm that determines 
whether an individual is healthy or ill is formed by the individual organism while it relates and 
responds to its environment. 
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It is precisely this idea of health and normality that Canguilhem (1904–1995) further 
develops in his main work, The Normal and the Pathological. According to Canguilhem, the 
most important characteristic of health is a flexibility of standards or norms.15 The healthy 
person or the normal person does not so much meet a predetermined standard of health; rather, 
the person’s health consists of having the possibility to set new norms or standards over and over 
again. Therefore, he says that being healthy means “being normative,” that is, being able to 
change and set norms. Whereas Goldstein states that normal physical action is based on a norm-
producing process of habituation and adaptation, on an interaction between the organism and the 
environment, Canguilhem emphasizes that this is an open and infinite process in someone who is 
healthy.  
According to Goldstein, illness or disease manifests itself in disturbed, disorderly 
behavior that goes hand in hand with a loss of skills (both cognitive and motor). His ideas about 
health and illness were crucially developed through the examination and treatment of many 
World War I veterans. These young soldiers suffered from all kinds of devastating health 
problems, including wound shock and shell shock. These symptoms typically could not be 
explained by the degree of the soldiers’ physical injuries.16 Goldstein, therefore, considered 
illness or disease not simply as a matter of organ or tissue failure but as a total body (or total 
organism) response. What he observed in injured veterans was that the loss of skills could trigger 
intense experiences of fear and uncertainty. He called this experience the “catastrophic 
reaction.”17 Merleau-Ponty and Canguilhem both take up Goldstein’s idea of illness.18 Illness 
manifests itself in a person’s having fewer possibilities. Merleau-Ponty describes this in terms of 
a flaccid intentional bow or a reduced “I can.” Canguilhem describes the pathological as an 
inferior norm of life (norme de vie). It is a norm but an inferior one “in the sense that it tolerates 
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no deviation from the conditions in which it is valid, incapable as it is of changing itself into 
another norm.”19 According to Canguilhem, being ill is not the same as being non-normal or 
abnormal. The sick person is not ill because  they deviate from a given norm; the sick person is 
ill because  they “can admit of only one norm.”20 As he states, the sick person “is not abnormal 
because of the absence of a norm but because of [their]incapacity to be normative.”21 This means 
that they are not able to create other norms in other situations. A sick person is thus “normalized 
in well-defined conditions of existence and has lost his normative capacity, the capacity to 
establish other norms in other conditions.”22 
Health or normality, therefore, means that the organism is capable of more than just 
adapting to the environment. When an organism can only adapt to its environment, it only 
follows that specific situation and is not able to exceed the norm of the situation. It then remains 
bound to that specific environment and is not normative. Just being able to adapt indicates 
pathology.23 We also saw this in the case of Schneider. Because he is capable of making concrete 
movements, Schneider is perfectly capable of coping with the given situation, but he is not able 
to play with or transcend the situation. 
The Silence of Health 
Goldstein, Canguilhem, and Merleau-Ponty all emphasize in their analysis of pathological cases 
the subjective illness experience, that is, the experience of illness from a first-person perspective. 
Referring to the then well-known statement of the French surgeon René Lériche (1879–1955) 
that “health is life lived in the silence of the organs,” Canguilhem states that illness is always 
related to the experience of the sick person.24 A person who only feels the silence of  their organs 
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is not sick in Canguilhem’s opinion. This seems to be an easily refuted claim since diseases do 
not always go together with an experience of being ill: for example, early-stage cancer can still 
be categorized as being within the “silence of the organs.” In such cases, people often do not feel 
anything is “wrong” or “abnormal” in their bodies. To diagnose a physical abnormality, 
physicians cannot trust patients’ experiences but must rely on all kinds of medical diagnostic 
equipment. Canguilhem would reject this objection while claiming that contemporary medical 
knowledge and equipment that allows us to diagnose a disease without it having been “heard” by 
the patient can ultimately be traced back to patients’ experiences. Medical knowledge, however 
disconnected it may now seem from patients’ experiences, has been able to develop only on the 
basis of a rich history of patients who have shared their experiences with doctors. In other words, 
a device that measures blood sugar levels, even at a level where people have no symptoms, has 
been developed only because people with actual symptoms of low blood sugar went to their 
doctor. That is why Canguilhem writes: “there is nothing in science that has not first appeared in 
the consciousness.”25  
It is interesting to note that Canguilhem uses the terms “pathology” and “pathological” 
when he talks about the experiences of sick people. In contemporary parlance, pathology refers 
to “disease,” and “disease,” according to medical sociology, involves the biomedical perspective 
on an ailment, and should be distinguished from “illness” (the person’s experience of that 
ailment) and “sickness” (the social meaning of being sick).26 Canguilhem, by contrast, suggests 
that pathology is not necessarily the same as some localizable defect in the body (disease) but 
rather has its origin in the experience of illness. Only when doctors have developed all kinds of 
diagnostic tests to determine a possible somatic cause of those complaints does it become a 
disease. At the beginning of this chapter, I referred to high blood pressure and mentioned that 
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even if people have an abnormal blood pressure value, they do not necessarily feel sick, and 
probably do not say they are sick. Symptomless high blood pressure is indeed not an illness, but 
it might be considered a disease or a precursor of disease since something is measured as being 
wrong or abnormal.  
While Merleau-Ponty, Goldstein, and Canguilhem all emphasize the patient’s first-person 
perspective, they criticize the prominence of the “disease-model” in contemporary medicine. 
This model, first developed in the eighteenth century and also described, for example, by 
Canguilhem’s student, Michel Foucault, in his Birth of the Clinic, meant that doctors place 
increasing emphasis on research into underlying defects and abnormalities in anatomy and 
physiology for understanding, diagnosing, and treating patients’ complaints. At the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, Bichat wrote that corpses had to be opened up in order to understand 
diseases better, thus creating a happy marriage between anatomy and pathology: anatomy 
becomes pathological while pathology is “anatomized.”27 
Before the eighteenth century, medicine focused more on the complaints and symptoms 
that patients reported to a doctor. In the modern era of medicine, the anatomical body became the 
focus. A disease, a pathology, is what you can locate somewhere in the body. Hence, as Leder 
argues, the body that is central in modern medicine is actually the dead body, the corpse of 
pathological anatomy.28 This emphasis on pathological disease, which in our time is increasingly 
reinforced by all kinds of diagnostic (imaging) technologies that make it possible to locate 
inconsistencies in the body without cutting it open, means that in clinical practice the patient’s 
story disappears into the background. Goldstein, Merleau-Ponty, and Canguilhem, by contrast, 
want to centralize the patient’s experience of illness. 
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Quantification of Pathology 
In addition to the emergence of the so-called disease model in medicine, Canguilhem describes 
how in the nineteenth century a shift also occurred from a qualitative to a quantitative concept of 
disease. In his historical analysis, Canguilhem shows how the definition of health as “normal,” 
introduced by the physician-physiologist Broussais (1772–1838), has led to the idea that the 
difference between disease and health is a quantitative difference.29 According to Broussais, 
every organ has a “normal state.” A deviation from this normal state implies illness, and this 
deviation occurs when an organ is, for example, too much or little stimulated by irritation or 
inflammation. In his time, Broussais was not taken that seriously, and was even caricatured in 
Honoré de Balzac’s work. Balzac ridiculed Broussais because, at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, Broussais was still a fervent advocate of bloodletting. Balzaz wrote that just as much 
blood had been shed under Broussais’ hands as during the Napoleonic battles.30 Ian Hacking 
states that it is because of Balzac’s parodies of Broussais that the term “normal” appears in the 
French language.31 And Canguilhelm claims that it is mainly due to August Comte (1798–1857) 
that the idea of health as a “normal state” eventually became a widespread idea. Based on the 
“eminent philosophical principle” of Broussais, Comte argues that the pathological and the 
normal state do not differ substantially, or qualitatively, from each other. The pathological state 
is nothing more than too much or too little compared to the normal state.32 This idea of disease is 
by no means foreign to us. Just think of the examples of normal and abnormal blood sugar levels 
or blood pressure. More sugar in the blood indicates a problem with an organ, and thus, a 
disease. With hypertension, or high blood pressure, the pressure of the blood on the wall of the 
blood vessel is so high that over time it can cause damage to the blood vessel wall. 
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In his analysis, Canguilhem criticizes this quantification of disease. First of all, he shows 
that both Broussais’ and Comte’s reasoning is not entirely consistent and that their 
determinations of “too much” or “too little” call for a qualitative, normative perspective: “To 
define the abnormal as too much or too little is to recognize the normative character of the so-
called normal state.”33 For Canguilhem (and also for Goldstein), the pathological cannot be seen 
as a condition that differs only quantitatively from the normal condition. When your blood 
pressure is higher than 130/80 mmHg, you are not necessarily ill. Illness implies a qualitatively 
different state than health: you feel different; you are no longer able to do things the way you did 
before. 
Canguilhem and Goldstein’s criticism of the idea of disease as a quantitative difference 
also goes hand in hand with their view that a statistical perspective does not contribute to the 
understanding of whether an individual is ill or healthy.34 A norm based on a statistical average 
does not do justice to the experience of the individual; such a norm cannot determine whether an 
individual is ill or healthy.35 At forty beats per minute, Napoleon’s pulse, compared to the 
average of seventy, is far too low, but the man was in good health. Apparently, those forty beats 
of his heart were sufficient to cope with the demands of life.36  
Merleau-Ponty’s work does not provide a comprehensive analysis of the meaning of 
statistics, but it is clear that, for him, a statistical perspective on the body is associated with the 
idea of the body as an object, the objective body. Such a perspective is not compatible with what 
he calls one’s own body (corps propre), lived body (corps vécu), or the body as a subject (corps 
sujet). The bodily subject experiences  themselves as embodied from the first-person perspective, 
which involves experiences of the body through localized sensations such as touch, pain, 
proprioception, kinesthetic sensations, warmth, and cold. Statistical measures of the body, like 
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the medical gaze of a doctor, form an external perspective, a third-person perspective that 
concerns the objective body (corps objectif). Because Merleau-Ponty is not explicitly interested 
in the question of what is normal (and what is not), as Canguilhem and Goldstein are, he does not 
spend many words on statistics. It is, therefore, even more interesting to focus on a passage in 
which he mentions the statistical perspective in relation to human characteristics. 
At the beginning of the chapter on freedom in the Phenomenology (in which he enters 
into a discussion with Sartre), Merleau-Ponty explains that one cannot have an awareness of 
one’s own qualities such as being jealous or being hunchbacked when one is restricted to a first-
person perspective, a perspective pour soi. Let us consider here the reference to the hunchback 
(le bossu). The figure of the hunchback is an interesting one because—certainly after Victor 
Hugo’s novel Notre Dame de Paris (1831) in which the hunchback Quasimodo plays the leading 
role—it is exemplary of abnormal embodiment in European culture. Merleau-Ponty describes the 
hunchbacked person as becoming aware of being hunchbacked only by comparing themselves 
with others, by seeing  themselves through the eyes of someone else with whom  they then take 
on a statistical or objective perspective on themselves.37 Statistically, most people have a fairly 
straight back and no hunchback. The hunchback is, therefore, a statistical deviation from the 
average. 
What is interesting about this incidental remark about the hunchback is Merleau-Ponty’s 
claim that it is partly due to statistics that people become aware that they deviate from the norm, 
that they are abnormal. Yet, this is not the same as an awareness of illness. Like Goldstein and 
Canguilhem, Merleau-Ponty assumes that statistics—which set supra-individual norms—do not 
help to determine whether an individual is ill or not. For all three of them, awareness of illness is 
based on the patient’s own experience, on the first-person perspective. This means that being 
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hunchbacked is not really considered an illness because the person who is hunchbacked does not 
experience it from  their first-person perspective as such. Here it becomes clear how we can 
interpret the difference between illness on the one hand and abnormality on the other hand in 
Goldstein, Canguilhem, and Merleau-Ponty. Illness is the lived experience of having fewer 
opportunities to deal with the situation and environment. Abnormality can exist without being 
“heard,” whereby it remains hidden under the “silence of the organs,” as long as it is not 
confronted with others and thus with a comparison with others. 
Statistics and Abnormality 
Abnormality, or abnormal embodiment, therefore, appears only within a framework of 
comparison. In medicine and public health, this framework is formed by large-scale biomedical, 
epidemiological and statistical measurements. Goldstein and Canguilhem were both trained as 
clinicians, and their criticism of the statistical approach should thus be seen in the light of their 
view that this approach does not do justice to the experiences and stories of their (individual) 
patients. This is, of course, different for Merleau-Ponty. He was not a physician, and his criticism 
of a statistical approach to the body was not inspired by the wish to improve clinical practice. His 
criticism is philosophical in nature. Putting the statistical perspective on the body in parentheses 
in order to gain a better understanding of the embodied existence fits within the 
phenomenological exercise of “returning to the things themselves.” The proposal for such a 
return implies that we should bracket our science-formed knowledge and prejudices as much as 
possible. Since the term “abnormal embodiment” is a result of statistics, it must be bracketed in 
the phenomenological interpretation of the embodied existence. In that sense, a phenomenology 
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of abnormality seems to be a contradiction in terms. It is, therefore, no wonder that Merleau-
Ponty does not use the term “abnormal” in his analysis of Schneider. Schneider, the patient (le 
malade), is contrasted with the normal (le normal). Nowhere is the normal (le normal) contrasted 
with the abnormal (l’anormal).38  
In the remainder of this chapter, I want to show, however, that it is also possible to 
develop a phenomenological approach to abnormal embodiment. I will explain that the statistics 
of abnormality are not just a neutral form of scientific knowledge that exists peacefully and 
independently of the way people experience their bodies. Even though we intend to bracket 
statistical knowledge for our phenomenological analysis of lived experiences from a first-person 
perspective, such a bracketing, or such a phenomenological reduction, can never be complete. 
Our world is permeated with statistics. Most of our daily activities are dictated by statistical 
norms. In order to clarify how statistical knowledge infiltrates the lived experience of people, I 
will now take a trip outside phenomenology to discuss Hacking’s analysis of statistics. In his 
historical analysis of nineteenth-century statistics in The Taming of Chance, Hacking establishes 
a direct link between the development of statistics and the emergence of the concept of “normal.” 
According to Hacking, the concept of “normal” in the sense of “usual,” “ordinary,” and 
“common” originated in the nineteenth century.39 Before that time, when it came to people or 
bodies, one did not speak of something like a normal person or a normal body but of “human 
nature.”40 The term “normal”—derived from the Latin norma and Greek ortho, which means 
“right angle”—takes on the meaning of “usual” through developments in statistics.  
One of the most important statistical ideas is that most characteristics or properties are 
“normally distributed” within a population. The term “normal distribution,” expressing this 
symmetrical distribution of properties, was introduced by Francis Galton (1822–1911) at the end 
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of the nineteenth century, but before that it was already thought of in terms of the so-called 
Gaussian curve, which was used in the calculation of probability and named after the German 
mathematician Carl Friedrich Gauss (1777–1855). If properties are normally distributed, this 
means that the mean or average coincides with the median (the value that is in the middle) and 
the mode (the value that occurs most often). A normal distribution curve looks like a so-called 
bell curve that is completely symmetrical. 
Typical examples of normally distributed properties include biometric properties (weight, 
height) and also students’ grades. A typical normal distribution emerges only when the statistical 
calculation of mean, median, and mode is based on a large sample. The normal distribution and 
the mean are descriptive models that give us insight into the variation of properties within a 
certain population. Hacking, however, shows that as soon as the normal distribution appears on 
stage as a descriptive model, it also immediately acquires a normative function. The work of the 
Belgian statistician Alphonse Quetelet (1796–1874)—according to Hacking, the “greatest 
regularity salesman” of the nineteenth century—is exemplary in this respect.41 Quetelet, who was 
very interested in all kinds of measures and calculations of the human body—thanks to him we 
also owe the still widely used Body Mass Index (BMI) or Quetelet Index—managed to obtain a 
biometric dataset from the Scottish army that was remarkably rich for the nineteenth century. 
The chest size of about 5,000 soldiers was measured, probably to determine measurements for 
new uniforms. According to Quetelet’s calculations, the chest size values are “normally” 
distributed. He did not yet call it a normal distribution—since that term was only later on 
introduced by Galton—but used the term “error curve,” which Gauss used to represent the values 
of measurement errors in astronomy.  
Post print. Published as: 
Jenny Slatman (2021). Toward a Phenomenology of Abnormality. In: Susan Bredlau & Talia Welsh (eds). 
Normality, Abnormality, and Pathology in Merleau Ponty. Albany NY: SUNY Press, p. 19-39 
 
According to Gauss, the error curve showed that the values that occur most frequently 
and are concentrated in the middle are the least false values. The measured values further from 
the center and that occur less frequently are—most probably—erroneous. By means of this 
curve, Gauss could indicate, based on many measurements, which measurement of a certain 
planet was most likely correct. When Quetelet uses this error curve—which has the same 
graphical form as the normal distribution—to calculate the average chest size of the Scottish 
soldier, something remarkable happens, as Hacking indicates. Whereas Gauss based the average 
or mean and, therefore, the most correct measurement on multiple measurements of one and the 
same planet, Quetelet calculates the average size of the chest on the basis of measurements of 
many different soldiers. Quetelet seems to see the measurements of many different thoraxes as a 
multitude of measurements of one and the same body—the “average body.” Quetelet thus 
approximates the average chest, or the average body, in the same way that Gauss considers a 
planet. Whereas a planet is a real entity, an average is not. Therefore, as Hacking writes: 
“Quetelet changed the game. He applied the same curve to biological and social phenomena 
where the mean is not a real quantity at all, or rather: he transformed the mean into a real 
quantity.”42  
This specific interpretation of the mean implies that values that lie (far) from the mean 
are considered to be errors, as actual deviations and not just as a statistical deviation. This means 
that if the average chest size is thirty-nine inches, then someone with a chest size of forty-seven 
inches is abnormal, a deviant. From the idea of the error curve, the average is equated with a 
standard or norm. A soldier with a chest size of forty-seven inches does not meet the standard. 
What we see in these analyses by Quetelet is that the average is not only a descriptive model of 
how the biometric values of chest size are distributed. The average itself becomes normative or 
Post print. Published as: 
Jenny Slatman (2021). Toward a Phenomenology of Abnormality. In: Susan Bredlau & Talia Welsh (eds). 
Normality, Abnormality, and Pathology in Merleau Ponty. Albany NY: SUNY Press, p. 19-39 
 
prescriptive in the sense that it indicates how the chest of a Scottish soldier should be. For 
Quetelet, the statistical average is ideal. Based on his conviction that the natural and social world 
is structured and organized according to certain laws of regularity, he assumes that the statistical 
average is the expression of the ideal type within a given population. Quetelet, therefore, like 
most of his colleagues, agrees that statistics are of great importance to identify and improve the 
qualities of a population. Statistics were indeed considered an important tool for what Francis 
Galton called “eugenics”: the theory that a population could be enhanced through the elimination 
of inferior (hereditary) characteristics while embracing one specific (racist) idea of humankind. 
Interestingly, whereas most eugenicists considered the above-average person (i.e., the person 
endowed with exceptional strength or intelligence) as ideal, Quetelet considers the average 
person—l’homme moyen—as ideal. The average person is not only a statistical construct 
according to Quetelet, but also an actual entity. He does not see the average person as a mediocre 
person (as Galton did after him). No, for him the average is the ideal. He literally says: “An 
individual who epitomized in himself, at a given time, all the qualities of the average man, would 
represent at once all the greatness, beauty and goodness of that being.”43 
Hacking’s analysis of Quetelet’s work shows how the seemingly neutral and descriptive 
statistical mean becomes directly normative. Although nowadays we do not directly link 
mediocrity to the greatness of mankind, even in our time the ideal of the average is often 
embraced when it comes to appearance. In the 1990s, psychologists established that a beautiful 
face is nothing more than an average face.44 Davis, who researched the motives of women who 
undergo cosmetic surgery, also observes that averages are more important than diversity.45 Most 
women who underwent cosmetic surgery indicated that they wanted to be “ordinary” or normal 
in the sense of ordinary. They did not necessarily want to be more beautiful; they wanted to be 
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more normal. So here we can clearly see how the idea of an average can easily ensure that 
individuals who, outside the scope of the statistically normal, regard themselves as different in a 
negative sense, and, therefore, even feel the pressure to adapt more to the norm, to normalize 
themselves, to belong more to the average, to be within the scope of the normal.46 When you are 
average or normal in a certain population, you do not stand out, and you do not attract attention. 
However, if you are not average, then you stand out and are confronted with the comparative 
views of others that may hinder you. In addition, our entire living environment is geared to 
averages: architects, designers, and tailors use sizes that suit the majority of the population. If 
you fall outside the bell curve of the normal, most things do not happen automatically. This point 
can help us to integrate the abnormal into phenomenology. 
A Phenomenology of the Abnormal 
Merleau-Ponty argues that the hunchback needs the third-person perspective if  they are is to 
become aware of the fact that  they are “different” from others. This is true, but this third-person 
perspective, which is fed by ideas about averages, is also part of our living environment. When 
Merleau-Ponty indicates that someone is not aware of  their own characteristics, such as being 
hunchbacked, it means that this form of being embodied for that person, without the gaze of the 
other, has something in itself that is self-evident. We can also say that when the hunchback is not 
aware of  their hump and experiences  their body as a matter of course,  their body forms the 
obvious zero point of action and orientation. This zero point coincides with the above-mentioned 
“I can.” Therefore, we can say that the “I can” of the hunchback who is not aware of  their 
hunchback is not diminished. 
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Based on his analysis of Schneider, Merleau-Ponty defines illness as a disruption or 
reduction of the “I can.” This is also in line with Goldstein’s view on disease in terms of a total 
body response resulting in “disordered behavior” and sometimes a “catastrophic reaction,” and 
Canguilhem’s idea that pathology goes hand in hand with the loss of normativity, that is, the 
capacity of setting norms. What I want to add here is that disturbances of the “I can” are not only 
provoked by illness or pathology. As Merleau-Ponty points out, there is a disturbance of the “I 
can” when the natural way to deal with your environment and situation is disturbed. But this 
disruption of the “I can” also occurs when people feel that their embodiment, their way of being 
embodied, is not self-evident within a specific social group. In his chapter “The Lived 
Experience of the Black (le Noir),” in his book Peau noire, masques blancs, Frantz Fanon states 
that being black in white France in the 1950s has a direct impact on his body scheme and thus on 
his physical subjectivity. According to Fanon, the body scheme—which for Merleau-Ponty 
forms the basis of the “I can”—must be exchanged for a “racial epidermal scheme” (schéma 
épidermique racial).47 In Queer Phenomenology, Sara Ahmed elaborates on this: “For bodies 
that are not extended by the skin of the social, bodily movement is not so easy. Such bodies are 
stopped.”48 Being black in a white world means that you stand out, that your being embodied as 
“black” is never self-evident, that instead of being a zero point of orientation, you often become 
a point of attention for others. In this sense, being black in a white world leads to an inhibition of 
intentionality and possibilities; it leads to being arrested both figuratively and literally. 
Merleau-Ponty, as we all know, makes no reference to skin color and argues that physical 
characteristics that are noticed from a third-person perspective belong, phenomenologically 
speaking, to the “objective body” and not to the lived body, the body as subject. Fanon and 
Ahmed show that skin color and racial characteristics have an enormous impact on the body as a 
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subject, the body as the incarnation of the “I can.” This observation can be extended to the 
domain of abnormal embodiment, that is, embodiment that statistically differs from what is 
considered normal within a social group, such as the hunchback. Because not being average 
within a social group often goes hand in hand with being different in a negative sense, it makes 
you stand out in this group, protruding so that you cannot pass for normal.49 If that is the case, 
being nonaverage can have an impact on the lived body. 
When Merleau-Ponty talks about the hunchback, he states that this person will experience 
themselves as different only from the perspective of the other. Perhaps it is true that a hunchback 
who lives in total social isolation or in a community with only hunchbacked people does not 
experience  their hunchback as something different. In real life, however, this is never the case. 
In real life, we are always confronted with the comparative views of others. This gaze can affect 
someone’s embodiment by transforming the self-evidently embodied zero point of action and 
orientation into a body that stands out to others. The gaze, therefore, directly affects the lived 
body because it breaks the self-evidence of it. Those whose physical appearance is statistically 
different can, therefore, experience a disturbance of their “I can” without any pathology as 
described by Merleau-Ponty, Canguilhem, or Goldstein.  
Goldstein wrote that pathology always goes hand in hand with abnormality, but that 
abnormality does not always go hand in hand with pathology.50 We can agree with this viewpoint 
of Goldstein if we think back to the example of high blood pressure. Blood pressure higher than 
130/80 mmHg is currently considered abnormal in the United States, but, as mentioned above, 
most people with such blood pressure do not feel ill and would probably not say they are ill. 
Goldstein would indeed say these people are not ill. We could, therefore, say that Goldstein’s 
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distinction between disease and abnormality can very well be used to counteract contemporary 
medicalization.51 
The norms and standards that Goldstein and Canguilhem are talking about are mainly 
physiological standards, standards that, according to Broussais, indicate the normal state of an 
organ or tissue. In this chapter, however, I am talking about norms or standards of how bodies 
appear. As I indicated above, standards of what a body should look like often correspond to 
average values within a population. Based on my explanation of the effect statistical reasoning 
can have in today’s societies, I have put forward the suggestion that the mere fact of being 
physically abnormal can also lead to a distortion of the zero point of action and, therefore, to a 
reduction in possibilities. This applies to any physical characteristics that can be observed by 
others; it applies if you are black in a white society, you have a hump in a society where the 
majority do not, you are much taller or smaller than most, you are missing a limb, your breast is 
amputated, or if your face is damaged. 
In the phenomenology of the body, this variation in physical characteristics is very often 
considered to be characteristic of only the objective body and, as such, is usually bracketed and 
kept out of the analysis. What I have just shown is that perceptible physical differences—
abnormality according to statistics—do not necessarily mean that someone is ill, but they should 
be included in the phenomenological analysis because they also concern the lived body. A 
phenomenology of abnormality integrates the third-person perspective, the perspective from the 
outside, into the first-person perspective. A phenomenology of abnormality can thus help us to 
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